Torts on Inland Waters--Admiralty Jurisdiction by Cronan, William P.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 39 
Issue 1 Winter 1974 Article 12 
Winter 1974 
Torts on Inland Waters--Admiralty Jurisdiction 
William P. Cronan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William P. Cronan, Torts on Inland Waters--Admiralty Jurisdiction, 39 MO. L. REV. (1974) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/12 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Comments
TORTS ON INLAND WATERS-ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a noticeable change in the recreational
habits of many American families; pleasure boats have crowded inland lakes
and rivers as the result of a "boating boom."' Increased leisure and afflu-
ence2 have made pleasure boating "America's fastest growing family recrea-
tional activity."3
In 1972 there were an estimated 8 million pleasure boats in the United
States and about 40 million boat users.4 There were 5,910,794 pleasure boats
registered with the U.S. Coast Guard.5 During the last year there were
3,942 reported boating accidents 6 involving 5,044 vessels.7 These accidents
1. READEts DGEsT, May 1973, at 57; Tvm, Sept. 6, 1968, at 94; TmLE,
July 5, 1963, at 56.
2. HousE COMvr. ON MERCHANT MAnmr AND FsHrmuEs, STUDY OF REcREA-
TIONAL BOATING SAFETY, H.R. REP. No. 378, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
3. Norris, The Landlubber Takes to the Water, 37 TEI.!. L.Q. 376 (1964).
4. R ADEnS DIGEST, May 1973, at 57.
5. 1972 BOATiG STATmTICS 6. (Coast Guard Publications CG-857).
6. Id. at 11. These statistics come from reports filed by the boat owners
following an accident. The Executive Secretary of the Missouri Boat Commission
believes that a large number of accidents (perhaps as many as 50 percent) go
unreported. Interview with John V. Buford, Executive Secretary of the Missouri
Boat Commission in Jefferson City, June 22, 1973. The Motorboat Act of 1940
(as amended), 46 U.S.C. § 526 (1970), The Federal Boating Act of 1958,
46 U.S.C. § 527 (1970), and the regulations which implement these laws require
that in case of collision, accident, or other casualty involving a motorboat or other
vessel, the operator must file a report if the occurrence resulted in (a) loss of
life, (b) personal injury incapacitating any person for more than 72 hours, or
(c) property damage in excess of $100. Section 306.140, RSMo (1969), imposes
a similar requirement. Under the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1451 (1971), new requirements for reporting accidents became effective on
July 1, 1973, but the statistics used herein do not reflect the new criteria.
These accident reports are not officially available for use in litigation. 46
U.S.C. § 526 1(c) (1970) does not make the reports confidential nor specify the
uses to which they may be put, but 46 C.F.R. § 173.10-1 (1972), repealed
37 Fed. Reg. 21404 (1972), required that they be kept confidential. Under
Missouri law, § 306.140, RSMo (1969), the reports are confidential and cannot
be used in litigation. Presumably, if one did obtain a copy of a report from the
Coast Guard this statute would not bind a federal court.
The Missouri Boat Commission forwards copies of its reports to the Coast
Guard. The Executive Secretary indicated to this writer that the commission will
informally release a copy of a report if it is to be used for settlement purposes
only, or if requested by an insurance company. Buford interview, supra.
There is an additional report available for fatal accidents. The Coast Guard
requires an investigation by one of its officers and a written report in major
accidents, particularly those involving loss of life. The findings of fact in such a
report are available to all interested parties. In major accidents a Board of
Investigation hears oral testimony and constructs a transcript.
7. BOATIG STATmCS, supra note 5, at 10. These statistics do not include
(28)
1
Cronan: Cronan: Torts on Inland Waters
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
TORTS ON INLAND WATERS
resulted in 1,437 fatalities," 829 personal injuries incapacitating the victim
for 72 hours or more,9 and $7,107,000 in property damage.10 Undoubtedly,
there were numerous unreported accidents as well. 1
Of these accidents, the Coast Guard has said:
Vessel capsizings have consistently accounted for more of the lives
lost in boating accidents each year than any other type of casualty.
The great majority of capsizings are attributed to some fault of the
operator in his handling of the vessel. Chief among these are im-
proper loading or overloading of the boat; ignoring weather warn-
ings, and proceeding under unfavorable weather conditions; and
operating in waters which exceed the limits of the craft and/or
the operator's training or experience. 2
Over half of the accident reports the Coast Guard received involved a
vessel colliding with another vessel or with a fixed object. The principal
cause of these collisions was the "failure of the operator to maintain a
forward lookout."' 3 These collisions produced the preponderance of the
reported personal injuries. Fires and explosions accounted for the next
largest number of personal injuries and caused the greatest amount of prop-
erty damage. Where a cause could be determined, the majority of the fires
and explosions were attributed to some fault of the boat operator "such
as improper installation or maintenance of engine or equipment, disobe-
dience of safe fueling practices, and lack of operating experience." 14
Attorneys will be called on to enforce claims for injuries or damage
sustained in such accidents.' 5 Despite the noncommercial nature of the
(a) accidents which did not directly involve a vessel, its equipment, or its
appendages; (b) cases in which the boat was used solely as a platform for other
activities, from which a person departed safely, and (c) accidents involving
commercial vessels.
8. Id. Not included are homicides, suicides, or deaths that were attributed
to "natural causes."
9. Id.
10. Id. at 12.
11. The Coast Guard makes a diligent effort to obtain accurate statistics.
States the Coast Guard:
Data ... are corroborated by an extensive newspaper clipping service,
and by figures of the National Safety Council and the National Center
for Health Statistics. Careful consideration of data from all available
sources indicate that almost all fatal boating accidents are included. The
fatal accident statistics are believed to correspond to the actual situation
.... Due to the lack of corroborative data regarding boating accident
injuries and property damage, the extent to which all reportable of this
type are actually reported is not known.
1970 BOATING STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 5.
12. Id. at 7.
18. Id.
14. Id.
15. See generally Nomus, MAumsn PERSONAL INjulEs (1966). See also
7 Am JuR. Trials §§ 1-73 (1964).
In admiralty, a claim is called a "libel"; the plaintiff is the libelant; the
defendant is the respondent; the attorney is a proctor. Use of these terms has been
avoided in this comment.
The Executive Secretary of the Missouri Boat Commission told this writer
that the commission's patrolmen spend a significant amount of their time testifying
19741
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vessel and the inland location of the tort, these claims may be cognizable
under the general maritime law and perhaps in an admiralty court. If so,
the prosecution of the claim may differ significantly from the prosecution
of a common law action in such critical areas as the plaintiffs right to a jury
trial, the effect of contributory negligence, the applicable statute of limita-
tions, the interpretation of the insurance contract,16 and limitation of
defendant's liability. This comment is intended to assist attorneys in recog-
nizing and handling a maritime claim.
II. JUpISDICrION17
A. In General
The Constitution states that the judicial power of the United States
includes "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." 8 The Judiciary
Act of 1789 gave the federal courts "exclusive original cognizance of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . saving to suitors, in all
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is compe-
tent to give it."' 9
The reason for this grant of power to the new national judiciary was
explained to the Virginia Convention of 1788, called to ratify the Constitu-
tion, by Governor John Randolph:
Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction cannot, with
propriety, be vested in particular state courts. As our national
tranquillity and reputation, and intercourse with foreign nations,
may be affected by admiralty decisions; as they ought therefore,
to be uniform; and as there can be no uniformity if there be thirteen
distinct, independent jurisdictions-this jurisdiction ought to be in
the federal judiciary .... 20
Although this reasoning is sound, history rather than logic compels the appli-
in civil litigation arising from boating accidents, and that these trials are almost
exclusively in state courts. Buford interview, supra note 6. Undoubtedly, some of
these actions are cognizable under the general maritime law.
16. The construction of marine insurance policies is within the admiraltyjurisdiction in this country. DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (No. 8776) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1815). This comment will not discuss the interpretation of a marine
insurance policy.
The words of the policy smell of the tang and the salt of the sea. They
bring up pictures of the Spanish Main of the Sixteenth Century. We
expect to see Captain Kidd or Sir Francis Drake jump out of the pages.
It illustrates the 'cake of custom' to see how the old marine policies
written four centuries ago persist to the present day.
Lind & Gaffney v. Boston Ins. Co., 1953 A.M.C. 1047 (Wash. 1953).
17. See ROBERTSON, ADmInALrry ANm FEDERALim (1970) for an extended
discussion.
18. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
19. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, I STAT. 76. The provision is now
found at 28 U.S.C. § 1883 (1970), and has been amended to read: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of (1)
Any civil cases, admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
20. 8 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 571 (1788).
[Vol. 39
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cation of admiralty law to a small pleasure craft on an inland waterway.2'
When the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 were adopted,
the traditional admiralty jurisdiction in England had been severely limited,
so that admiralty could accept only cases occurring on the sea or in English
ports and harbors. 22 In this country the Supreme Court has gradually
expanded admiralty jurisdiction. In 1847 the jurisdiction extended "as far
as the tide flows" into inland rivers.23 In 1851 it was said that the admiralty
jurisdiction applies "to any other public water used for commercial purposes
and foreign trade."24 The Supreme Court now interprets the admiralty
jurisdiction to include "all navigable waters within the country."25 A water
is navigable "if navigable in fact."26 It is not enough to be able to float a
skiff, 27 but the ability to operate a small motorboat can render a stream
navigable.28
A stream is within the navigable waters of the United States, and thus
subject to admiralty jurisdiction, when in its ordinary condition it will, by
itself or with other waters, form "a continued highway over which commerce
is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the custom-
ary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water."29 Thus, a land-
locked lake, whether privately or publicly owned, is not within the admiralty
jurisdiction 0 unless it lies on a state line.31 Navigable privately owned canals
and other waters that connect up with a highway of commerce are within
the admiralty jurisdiction.32
21. See RoBERTSON, supra note 17, for a discussion of the development of
admiralty jurisdiction in the United States. Justice Story was the great admiralty
judge in the early years of the nation, perhaps because of his early association
with the town of Marblehead, Mass., where he was born and had his first law
office. Of Justice Story's diligence in expanding the admiralty jurisdiction it was
reportedly said, "If a bucket of water were brought into his court with a corn cob
floating in it, he would at once extend the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States over it." Note, Extension of Federal Jurisdiction Over State Canals, 37
AMER. L. REv. 911, 916 (1903).
22. The reason for the contraction in admiralty jurisdiction was that the
common law judges' fees were thereby increased. See Laing, Historic Origins of
Admiralty Jurisdiction in England, 45 MicH. L. Ray. 168 (1946); 1 HormswoRTm,
HisToRY oF ENGLISH LAw 522-59 (1922). For an interesting discussion of the
growth of the admiralty jurisdiction in England after the beginning of the nine-
teenth century see WISWALL, TBE DE VLOP ENT OF ADimnALTY JURISDIcTION
AND PRACTiCE SiNCE 1800 (1970).
23. Waring v. Clark, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 461 (1847).
24. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457 (1851). Accord, The
H.D. Bacon, 8F. Cas. (No. 4232) (D.C. Mo. 1853).
25. Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31, 41 (1943).
26. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
27. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 683 (1900); The Montello, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 442 (1874); In re River Queen, 275 F. Supp. 403 (W.D.
Ark. 1967), involving the White River in Arkansas.
28. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926).
29. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
30. Doran v. Lee, 287 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Marine Office of
American v. Manion, 241 F. Supp. 621 (D. Mass. 1965); Shogry v. Lewis, 225
F. Supp. 741 (D. Pa. 1964).
31. Wreyford v. Arnold, 82 N.M. 156, 477 P.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1970).
32. Dagger v. U.S.N.S. Sands, 287 F. Supp. 939 (D.W. Va. 1968); Guilbeau
v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 215 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. La. 1963).
1974]
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The stream must be capable of sustaining commerce, but it need not
be so used in fact.33 An artificial obstruction, like a dam or low highway
bridge, does not render a body of water nonnavigable if it was capable of
sustaining commerce in its natural state.3 4 That occasional difficulties are
encountered in navigating the stream, as where it is necessary to portage
around falls or rapids, does not preclude a judicial finding of navigability.35
Each case is to be determined "on its own facts,"36 but once a court
has determined that a waterway is navigable, courts in subsequent cases
will likely follow that determination.37 The opposite is not true; a water-
way that has been nonnavigable may become so through construction
of improvements.3 8
The situs of the tort determines the applicable law.39 Thus, the general
maritime law applies where the injury occurs on navigable waters of the
United States, although the act of negligence occurs on land. A product
liability suit involving defective manufacture of a vessel or its equipment
is an admiralty claim.40 But structures like wharves and piers affixed per-
manently to shore and bed are extensions of the land, and therefore remedies
for injuries on them are determined by local law.41 However, Congress has
88. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441 (1874).
84. Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 123 (1921);
Watring v. Inboard Motorboat No. WV4488AB, 822 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.W. Va.
1971); Madole v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. La. 1965). Contra: In re
Stephens, 841 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Ga. 1965).
85. United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). It is not enough
for a stream to be navigable when subject to a flood of brief duration and
uncertain recurrence. The high water must occur with reasonable frequency and at
times of reasonable certainty. Frazie v. Orleans Dredging Co., 182 Miss. 193,
180 So. 816 (1938).
36. United States v. Utah, 288 U.S. 64, 87 (1931).
87. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 811 U.S. 377, 408
(1940).
88. Id.
89. See Hess v. United States, 861 U.S. 314, 318 (1960); Kermarec v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959); The Plymouth,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1865); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d
758 (8d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
For a discussion of maritime claims involving aircraft see Comment, Admi-
ralty Tort Jurisdiction and Aircraft Accident Cases: Hops, Skips, and jumps Into
Admiralty, 38 J. Am L. 53 (1972); Note, Admiralty-jurisdiction over Aviation
Tort Claims-Admiralty Jurisdiction Does Not Extend to Aviation Tort Claims
in the Absence of a Significant Relationship Between the Tort and Traditional
Maritime Activities, 6 VAN. J. TnAzs. L. 649 (1973).
40. See Lindsay v. McDonnell-Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th
Cir. 1972), adopting strict liability in tort as part of the general maritime law in
product liability cases in the Eighth Circuit; In re Alamo Chem. Transp. Co.,
320 F. Supp, 631 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Annot., Products Liability Claim as Within
Admirality Jurisdiction, 7 A.L.R. FED. 502 (1971); Comment, Cause of Action
in Strict Products Liability Lies in Admiralty and Sounds in Tort for Jurisdic-
tional Purposes, 3 J. MA=rrmm L. 408 (1972).
41. Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184 (D. Md. 1965); Inland Barge Co.
v. Nasbitt, 210 F. Supp. 690 (S.D. Ind. 1962). Compare Dardar v. Louisiana St.
Dept. of Highways, 447 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1971), holding that a ferry which
periodically traversed a waterway in transporting cars was not an extension of
the land although connected to a cable attached to structures on either shore.
[Vol. 39
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determined that maritime law applies in a collision on navigable waters
between a vessel and wharves or foreshores.
42
B. Navigable Waters of the United
States Located in Missouri
That a tort occur upon navigable waters of the United States is
essential for admiralty jurisdiction. The concept of navigability, however, is
so elusive that knowledgeable attorneys might argue forever about it.43
To obtain some guidance in determining whether a claim can be brought
under general maritime law, one can look to the U.S. Coast Guard. The
Second Coast Guard District Operations Plan44 contains a list of Missouri
rivers with determinations of their navigability.45 This Coast Guard deter-
Is a fall from a dock, after alighting from a vessel, cognizable in admiralty? Yes,
according to Tullis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 397 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1968).
Where during a period of time immediately preceding the libelant's (plain-
tiff S) ill-fated dive from a pier into 18 inches of water, he had engaged in
recreational activity having its focal point in the water and not on the dock,
the situs of the tort was the navigable waters, but admiralty jurisdiction did not
extend because tort was not of a maritime nature. Chapman v. City of Grosse
Pointe Farms, 885 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
42. The Admiralty Extension Act, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970); see also
Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 210 (1963); Canadian Aviator
Ltd. v. United States, 826 U.S. 215, 225 (1945).
43. For a good discussion see Laurent, Judicial Criteria of Navigability in
Federal Cases, 1953 Wis. L. Rav. 8; Sovel, Determining the Applicable Law in
Cases Arising in State Territorial Waters, 87 Tmp. L.Q. 479 (1964).
44. Second Coast Guard District Operations Plan, pages C-V-10 through
G-V-12 (1973).
45. Apple Creek ..... Not a navigable water of the United States.






Gasconade River . . .
Grand River
Kansas River.....








Navigable upriver to Van Buren, Mo. (Accord,
33 C.F.R. § 2.47-1 (1972)).
Not navigable (Accord, 83 U.S.C. § 29 (1970)).
Navigable upriver to Raccoon River.
Navigable upriver to Noel, Mo.
Navigable upriver for 107 miles.
Navigable upriver to New Brunswick, Mo.
Navigable to Junction Smokey Hill and Republi.
can River.
Navigable below Warsaw, Mo. (Accord, 33 C.F.R.
§ 2.47-15 (1972). See also Loc-Wood Boat &
Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 806 (8th Cir.
1957); Wiesemann v. Pavlat, 418 S.W.2d 23, 25
(St. L. Mo. App. 1967)).
Navigable.
Not navigable (Privately owned).
Not navigable.
Navigable to Valley Park, Mo., upriver at mile 21.
Navigable (Contra, regarding water body formed
by removal of dirt from pit approximately 50 to
200 feet wide and several miles long with opening
at either end into the Mississippi River, United
States v. Ross, 74 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Mo. 1947)).
1974]
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mination is only persuasive, not binding, on the court.48 A court may always
decide for itself whether a particular stream is a navigable water of the
United States (and thus subject to the general maritime law), nonnavigable,
or a navigable state waterway (of which there are very few). 47
Several streams are listed in the plan as not navigable, not because of
a factual determination by the Coast Guard, but because Congress has
instructed the Coast Guard that they be considered not navigable.48 The
most notable of these streams is the Platte River. The Coast Guard would
apparently consider the Platte navigable but for the statute.49 The courts
Missouri River . . . . Navigable (Accord, 33 C.F.R. § 2.47-5 (1972)).
Nodaway River. . . . Not navigable (Accord, 33 U.S.C. § 37 (1970))
Norfolk Lake ..... Navigable (Accord, 33 C.F.R. § 2.47-10 (1972)).
North Fork of the
Cuivre River. . . . Not navigable (Accord, 33 U.S.C. § 29 (1970)).
One Hundred and
Two River ..... Not navigable (Accord, 33 U.S.C. § 40 (1970)).
Osage River ..... Navigable to and including Lake of the Ozarks
(Accord, 33 C.F.R. § 2.47-15 (1972)).
Platte River ...... .Not navigable (Accord, 33 U.S.C. § 42 (1970)).
See also Cambest v. McComas Hydroelectric Co.,
212 Mo. App. 325, 245 S.W. 598 (K.G. Ct. App.
1922)).
St. Francis River ... Navigable upriver for 308 miles.
Salt River ....... Navigable upriver for 5.1 miles.
Wappapello Reservoir Not navigable.
West Fork of the
Cuivre River. . . . Not navigable (Accord, 33 U.S.C. § 29 (1970)).
White River ...... .Navigable to upper reaches of Table Rock Lake
(Accord, 33 C.F.R. § 2.47-20 (1972), stating
that the stream is navigable "to Branson, Missouri,
at mile 520.").
The Coast Guard plan does not distinguish between navigable state waters (which
are not in the stream of commerce and thus not subject to the admiralty jurisdic-
tion) and nonnavigable waters, calling both "not navigable." That feature of the
operations plan is preserved in the above chart. The chart does not purport to
be complete-it is reproduced here to illustrate how little is required for a stream
to be navigable.
There are few Missouri cases decided under the general maritime law,
although many undoubtedly are cognizable in admiralty. Many cases, of course,
involve navigability of a stream for some other purpose, viz., to determine the
rights of a riparian landowner or to quiet title to a stream bed. For these decisions
see 22 Mo. DIGEST Navigable Waters (1951).
46. Wreyford v. Arnold, 82 N.M. 156, 477 P.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1970).
47. Id. The dissenting opinion in Wreyford argues that whether a waterway
is within the navigable waters of the United States is, or should be, a matter of
fact to be decided at the trial level. However, a court may (as the majority in
Wreyford does) take judicial notice that a river is navigable, at least insofar as
the waters are within its jurisdiction. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423,
452 (1931).
48. See note 45 supra. The rivers are the Cuivre, Nodaway, the North Fork
of the Cuivre, One Hundred and Two, Platte, and the West Fork of the Cuivre.
49. This conclusion is based on conversations with officers of the Second
Coast Guard District, May 15, 1973. But see Cambest v. McComas Hydroelectric
Co., 212 Mo. App. 325, 245 S.W. 598 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922).
[Vol. 39
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are not bound by this Congressional determination on navigability.50
C. The "Saving to Suitord' Clause51
Although the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive, 2 most
tort actions cognizable under maritime law need not be brought in admiralty
court. Plaintiff may sue in state court,53 on the "civil side" 54 of federal
district court under diversity jurisdiction, or in admiralty. The choice exists
because of the "Saving to Suitors" clause in the judiciary Act of 1789.n1
That which is saved the suitor is his remedy, not substantive rights.
Regardless which court hears the action, the substantive maritime law will
apply and the parties's rights and liabilities will not, in theory, be different.
State courts, however, may be more reluctant than federal courts to decide
that the general maritime law applies.56 Even if a common law court does
apply the general maritime law, the rules of civil procedure will apply.57
Some early cases construing the savings clause did hold that it was not
necessary to apply the maritime law when an admiralty case was commenced
in a state court,58 but later decisions have uniformly required the state court
to conform to the maritime law as developed by the federal courts." At
times, however, the maritime law will not determine an issue; in such a case
state substantive law may have a role.
The maritime law is not a complete body of law, comprehensive in
scope and covering every possible aspect of a personal injury or property
damage case. It is a limited collection of principles that have been devel-
50. Congress passed the statutes pursuant to the commerce power, U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8 (8). It was said in The Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 448, 452 (1850) that:
They [the commerce power and the admiralty jurisdiction] are entirely
distinct things, having no necessary connection with one another, and are
conferred in the Constitution by separate and distinct grants.
See Comment, Admiralty Law and Pleasure Boating in Nebraska, 45 NEB. L.
Bxv. 572, 574 n.22 (1966). See also United States v. Banister Realty Co., 155 F.
Supp. 583 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1907).
51. See generally Norms, supra note 15, § 84; ROBERTSON, supra note 17,
at 128-35, 271-83.
52. Gill v. The Continental, F. Cas. 372 (No. 5,425) (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1874).
58. Conrad v. De Montcourt, 188 Mo. 311, 89 S.W. 805 (1897); State
ex rel. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Falkenhainer, 809 Mo. 224, 274
S.W. 758 (1925).
54. The term "civil side" of federal district court is used to distinguish it
from admiralty. The distinction is functionally similar to that between law and
equity. Today, of course, there is only one action, the civil action.
55. See Comment, State Jurisdiction in the Maritime Realm; Herein the
Saving Clause, Its Background, Scope, and Effect, 16 MERCER L. REv. 450
(1965).
56. This would be a natural tendency, based on the court's greater familiarity
with its own law.
57. State ex rel. Kansas City Bridge Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Comp.
Comm., 81 S.W.2d 986 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935), aff'd, 92 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1936).
58. Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893); The Max Morris, 187 U.S. 1
(1890); Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 889 (1874); In re Pennsylvania
R.R., 48 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1931).
59. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 846 U.S. 406 (1953); Knickerbocker Ice
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oped to meet uniquely maritime problems,60 and it must at times be
supplemented by the common law. One writer has suggested that there is
a trend toward increasing application of state law in admiralty matters to
plug these holes, at least where small, noncommercial vessels are involved.61
Although plaintiffs decision to bring his action in state or federal court
should have little effect on the substantive law applicable, it may have
important procedural and strategic consequences. A jury will decide the facts
if the action is brought in state court or on the civil side of federal court.
6 2
If a plaintiff brings his case in state court, the defendant's first thought
may be to remove to federal court. This may not be possible. The United
States Supreme Court, in Romero v. International Terminal Co.,63 has
apparently decided that removal to the "civil side" of federal court is not
possible under the federal question jurisdiction. 64 One can therefore remove
to the federal court's "civil side" only on a showing of diversity plus the
jurisdictional amount. It is not possible to remove from state court to the
admiralty side of the federal district court because that would nullify the
benefit of the "savings" clause and deny plaintiff his choice of forum
and remedy. 5
In general, a plaintiff may bring any in personam maritime action in
state court, taking advantage of the saving to suitors clause.66 If an action
is in rem, however, the admiralty court has exclusive jurisdiction, regardless
of the savings clause.6 7 The test seems to be whether the defendant is a
60. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1954);
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); GramoRE & BrcK,
ADmiRA.TY 42 (1957).
61. Sovel, Determining the Applicable Law in Cases Arising in State Terri-
torial Waters, 37 TEMp. L.Q. 479, 484 (1964).
62. A jury trial is available in admiralty court actions arising on the Great
Lakes where the vessel weighs over twenty tons, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970). Since
the merger of admiralty with the civil action under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1966 it has been possible to join in the same complaint causes of
action that are entitled to a jury trial with a maritime cause of action. In such
cases, the jury will decide the issues of fact that are common to both claims.
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 874 U.S. 16 (1963); Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 869 U.S. 469 (1962); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores v. Ellerman Lines,
369 U.S. 355, 860 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 859 U.S. 500,
509-10 (1959); Romero v. International Term. Op. Co., 358 U.S. 354, 880
(1959); Wiesemann v. Pavlat, 413 S.W.2d 23 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967); Comment,
Pendent Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 594 (1973).
63. 858 U.S. 354 (1959).
64. Id. See also Comment, The Federal Question in Maritime Cases: "Con-
gressional Intent," 8 STA'1. L. REV. 129 (1955).
65. Steamboat Co. v. Chance, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872); Leon v.
Galceran, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 185 (1870); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624
(1868); Hill v. United Fruit Co., 149 F. Supp. 470 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
66. Panama R.R. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 (1926); New Jersey Steam Nay.
Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 722 (1848).
67. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 642 (1868); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 441 (1866); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866). See
generally Comment, Developments in the -Law of Maritime Liens, 45 TuL.
L. REV. 574 (1971).
[Vol. 39
9
Cronan: Cronan: Torts on Inland Waters
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1974
TORTS ON INLAND WATERS
person (or corporation) rather than a ship or navigation device.68 In the
latter case, the state court may not act.69
III. LnTATON OF LIABILIT
Under the maritime law a vessel is personalized. The negligence of a
vessers master or operator is imputed to the ship herself; it is "she" who is
at fault. The owner in turn is responsible for his vessel.70
In 1851, in an apparent effort to stimulate the shipbuilding industry,
Congress passed the Limitation of Liability Act.' The act was intended
to place American merchant shipping on an equal footing with European
competitors who enjoyed such right of exculpation at home.7 2 The statute
allows a vessel owner to limit his liability for damages to the value of his
damaged vessel73 if he can show that the injury occurred without his
"privity or knowledge."74 In effect, the owner is saying, "I didn't know
what was going on. Here, you take my ship and we'll call it even." Owners
of pleasure boats may take advantage of this act.75
68. Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954), aff'g, 40 Cal. 2d 65,
251 P.2d 1 (1952), noted in 42 CALIF. L. lEv. 331 (1954), 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 746 (1953), 42 GEo. L. REv. 534 (1954), 68 HAIv. L. Rlv. 164 (1954).
69. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868); The Hine v. Trevor, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 441 (1866).
70. Gutierez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 209 (1963).
71. 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-89 (1970). See generally Nomus, supra note 15,§§ 111-19. The last section of Nonus includes forms for use in a limitation
action.
72. Chief Justice Taft commented in Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Southern
Pac. Co., 273 U.S. 207 (1927), that
[T]he great object of the statute was to encourage shipbuilding and to
induce investment of money in this branch of industry, by limiting the
venture of those who build the ship to the loss of the ship itself or her
freight then pending, in cases of damage or wrong, happening without
the privity or knowledge of the ship owner, and by the fault or neglect
of the master or other person on board.
Id. at 214. See also American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261
(1933); Liverpool, B. & R.P. Steam Nav. Co. v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 251
U.S. 48 (1919); The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894).
73. If the vessel is totally destroyed there is no liability. California Yacht
Club v. Johnson, 65 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1933). See discussion of salvage rights
note 100 infra.
74. 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1970).
75. It is widely assumed by admiralty lawyers that the Limitation Act does
apply to pleasure vessels. See Petition of Porter, 272 F. Supp. 282, 285 (1967),
where the argument that the Act did not apply to pleasure boats was specifically
rejected. But see Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1937) (15-foot motor-
boat); Gray's Landing Ferry Co. v. Stone, 46 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1931) (18-foot
rowboat carrying 10 passengers); The Mistral, 50 F.2d 957 (W.D.N.Y. 1931);
Petition of Liebler, 19 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937). The statute applies to
"any vessel." 46 U.S.C. § 183 (a) (1970).
For an argument in favor of including small pleasure craft under the Act
see Petition of Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1954); for a
contrary view see Petition of Madsen, 187 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y. 1960). In
Harolds, Limitation of Liability and Its Application to Pleasure Boats, 37 Tximxp.
1974]
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A vessel owner seeking limited liability may proceed in two ways.78
First, where no state court actions have been commenced against him he
may bring a limitation proceeding in admiralty court (and often including
in the petition a demand for exoneration from any liability)."r If a claim
against him has been filed in admiralty court, then limitation may be
raised in the answer to that claim.78 Either way, limitation actions are
cognizable only in federal admiralty court.79 After the petition has been
filed, potential claimants will be given a period of time in which to file their
claims in admiralty court.8 0 The admiralty court will then determine if the
vessel's owner is liable on the claims, and if so, whether that liability should
be limited."'
Alternatively, the owner may use the act somewhat like an affirmative
defense to actions filed against him in state courts. Each injured party
should have brought his claim under the general maritime law. If there
L.Q.-428, 428 (1964), the author concludes that the Supreme Court has not
squarely passed on the issue of the applicability of the limitation statute to
pleasure boats.
76. The Quarrington Court, 102 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 307
U.S. 645 (1939), stating that an owner may defend an independent suit brought
against him, or may initiate a limitation proceeding in admiralty court and require
all claimants to establish their rights therein.
A petition for limitation is a protective measure which neither admits
liability nor waives any defense. Petition of United States, 367 F.2d 505 (3d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 932. (1967).
77. M. Norris, Limitation of Liability, PRoGRAm MATERAmS: SEtNA~n ON
TfE LAW OF ADmImALTY As IT APPLIES TO PLEASURE BOATING, p. MJN-2; FED. R.
Civ. P. Sup'p. F(2).
78. The Chickie, 141 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1944).
79. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); Stark v. Texas Co., 88 F.2d
182 (5th Cir. 1937). Admiralty derives its jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. § 183
from the nature of the occurrence. Guillot v. Cenac Towing Co., 366 F.2d 898
(5th Cir. 1966).
80. FED. R. Crv. P. Stpp. F(4) reads in part as follows:
The date so fixed shall not be less than 30 days after issuance of the
notice. For cause shown, the court may enlarge the time within which
claims may be filed. The notice shall be published in such newspaper
or newspapers as the court may direct once a week for four successive
weeks prior to the date fixed for the filing of claims. The plaintiff not
later than the day of second publication shall also mail a copy of the
notice to every person known to have made any claim against the vessel
or the plaintiff arising out of the voyage or trip on which the claims
sought to be limited arose. In cases involving death a copy of such
notice shall be mailed to the decedent at his last known address, and also
to any person who shall be known to have made any claim on account
of such death.
Once an admiralty court acquires jurisdiction over a limitation of liability
proceeding, its jurisdiction is exclusive. In re Northern Transatlantic Carriers
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 866 (D.P.R. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 423 F.2d 139
(1st Cir. 1970).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(5), F(8). See also Colonial Sand & Stone Co.
v. Muscelli, 151 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1945), holding that the right to limit liability
is distinct from the question of the existence of liability, although both may be
tried at one time for convenience; The James Horan, 10 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.J.),
affd, 78 F.2d 870 (8d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 621 (1935).
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is more than one claim pending, upon the filing of the limitation action
the admiralty court will enjoin the continued prosecution of the state
court actions8 2 and will consolidate them for hearing in the admiralty
court. If liability is found and limitation is granted, then the claimants will
share the value of the vessel.as If limitation is not granted, the admiralty
court will not decide the value of the claims, but will allow the continuance
of the state court actions.84
Where limitation is filed and there is only one state action pending,
the state court action will be allowed to continue to judgment; a jury may
decide the matter of liability and damages.8 5 Limitation may be asserted
in the state proceeding but it does not have to be litigated there.8 6 Follow-
ing the state court judgment on liability, the admiralty court may decide
the issue of limitation."
Regardless which course of action is chosen, it is necessary that the
limitation action be filed within six months after receipt of a written notice
of a claim.88
82. FD. B. Civ. P. Supp. F(3). In re Northern Transatlantic Carriers Corp.,
300 F. Supp. 866 (D.P.R. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 423 F.2d 139 (1st
Cir. 1970); Petition of Tracy, 86 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (administratrix
not permitted to prove her damages in state court); The Steamtug S & H No. 7,
Inc., 32 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. F(1), F(8). The fact of insurance does not affect
the amount of the owners liability. Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118
U.S. 468 (1886). But, limitation of liability is not available to owner's insurer
sued directly under Louisiana direct action statute. Olympic Towing Corp. v.
Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989(1970).
84. Petition of Follett, 172 F. Supp. 304 (S.D. Tex. 1958) (once limitation
denied the state courts may continue their cases, since to do otherwise would
deny the claimants their rights under common law remedies, including jury trial,
without protecting any established right of the owner).
85. In re Putnam, 55 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1932) (where only one claim could
arise, the yacht owner petitioning for limited liability was denied an injunction
forbidding actions against him even though that one claim exceeded the value of
the yacht). See Petition of Boraks, 142 F. Supp 364 (D. Mass. 1956), stating
that the real reason for bringing all claims into the limitation proceeding is to
marshal assets and insure an equitable distribution.
86. The state court can decide the limitation issue where there is only
one claim. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931). The reason why limitation
may be raised in the state action is to avoid problems with the six-month statute
of limitations applicable to limitation petitions. See note 88 infra; Larsen v. North-
land Transp. Co., 292 U.S. 20 (1934); Petition of Trawler Weymouth, Inc., 223
F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass 1963).
87. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
88. 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). This six-month statute of limitations was added
to the law in 1986.
In the following cases the written notice has been held sufficient: Petition
of Allen N. Spooner & Sons, Inc., 253 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1958) (notice of claim
was a letter stating "We may press a claim against you."); Standard Wholesale
Phosphate & Acid Works v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1939)
(letter from insurance company notifying employer of company's right of sub-
rogation to any claims that injured employees might have); The Irving, 28 F.
Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 107 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1939) (notice sufficient
even though it simply informed vessel owner that 550 tons of plaster were a
19741
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The proper venue for a limitation of liability petition in admiralty
court will depend upon the vessers status. 9 The limitation complaint will
be filed in that district in which the vessel has been attached or arrested
in respect to a claim for which limitation is sought.90 If the vessel has not
been attached or arrested, the limitation action may be heard in any district
court in which the vessel owner has been sued with respect to a claim.91 If
neither of the above has occurred limitation proceedings may be commenced
in the district in which the vessel is found.92
When filing a limitation action security must be posted with the
admiralty court. This may be a deposit equal to the value of the boat in its
damaged condition or, at the vessel owner's option, the owner's interest
in the boat may be transferred to a court-appointed trustee.93
Limitation of liability is possible only when the vessel owner is without
privity or knowledge of the fault or negligence that caused or contributed
to the injury. "Privity" means that the owner in some way participated in
the cause of the injury;94 "knowledge" signifies that the owner is cognizant
of the condition that caused the accident.95 The burden of proof is on the
total loss and that the owner would be held liable for all damages; did not
contain a statement of amount claimed as damages).
The notice was insufficient in the following cases: Petition of Anthony
O'Boyle, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (mere knowledge of the ship-
owner of the accident is insufficient; written notice required); The Belleville,
35 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) (letter written in the Norwegian language by
injured employee's wife saying the husband needed the money "and I hope I get
what he is asking for.").
See Petition of American M.A.R.C., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Cal. 1963)
(an effective notice given by one claimant will start the period running as to
all claimants).





94. Coryell v. Phipps, 817 U.S. 406 (1948). Limitation is not available
where the owner was operating the vessel. Davis v. United States, 185 F.2d 988
9 th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 840 U.S. 982 (1951). In Stewart v. Stephens, 225
a. 185, 166 S.E.2d 890 (1969), the Georgia Supreme Court applied the
"family purpose" doctrine to impute the negligence of defendant's 18-year-old
daughter-operator to her parent. The case was not brought under the general
maritime law; it is unclear if this result would obtain if it were. See Feleyn v.
Gamble, 185 Minn. 857, 241 N.W. 87 (1932), indicating the family purpose
doctrine may not apply in a maritime case.
95. The Cleveco, 154 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1946). In The Inga, 83 F. Supp.
122 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), the boat owner knew that the engine was sputtering and
leaking gasoline; gas vapors in the bilge exploded; the owner was denied limita-
tion. Accord, The Friendship If, 113 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom, Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 888, rehearing denied. 812 U.S.
716 (1941) (defective exhaust leaking carbon dioxide into stateroom).
Five men were returning from a rabbit hunt aboard an 18-foot cabin cruiser.
The boat was going at full throttle with the owner at the helm. Wishing to go
below into the cabin, the owner turned the navigation of the boat over to an
inexperienced member of the hunting party. The boat crashed into a bank at full
speed. Held: limitation of liability denied. Nuccio v. Royal Ind. Co., 280 F. Supp.
468 (D. La. 1968).
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vessel owner-he must prove the negative, i.e., that he lacked privity or
knowledge.9 6 This can be difficult, for the failure to exercise "due dili-
gence" may amount to privity.9 7 The negligent failure to discover a vessers
unseaworthy condition may amount to privity or knowledge.9 8 And, of
course, for corporation-owned vessels, privity of knowledge of a manager or
general agent of the corporation will be imputed to the corporation.9
IV. COLLISIONS wrrH ANonTm VESS. oR FixED OBjEcr
A. In General
Collision'"0 cases under the general maritime law are governed by
statutory and regulatory precepts known collectively as the "Rules of the
Road."' 0 ' A violation of these Rules is negligence per se.102 The Rules, unlike
96. Coryell v. Phipps, 817 U.S. 406 (1943); Austerberry v. United States,
169 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1948); Petition of Binstock, 213 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), aff'd, 303 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1964).
97. The Malcolm Baxter, Jr., 277 U.S. 323 (1928); Loc-Wood Boat &
Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957).
98. McNeil v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 387 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1967); Petition
of Long, 293 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
99. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Hicks, 285 U.S. 502 (1932); The
Cleveco, 154 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1946). The knowledge or privity of an ordinary
employee not having a managerial function will usually not be imputed to the
corporation. U.S. v. Eastern Transp. Co., 59 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1932).
100. This comment does not discuss salvage rights in detail. Salvage is
compensation allowed to persons who assist in saving a ship or its cargo from
impending danger, or assist in its recovery from actual loss. BLAci's LAW Dincro-
NARY 1580 (4th ed. rev. 1968). The following quotation from Norris, The
Landlubber Takes to the Waters, 37 TEp. L.Q. 375, is illustrative of the right:
Recently on a Sunday afternoon a large cabin cruiser was lazily sailing
along on one of the Great Lakes not far offshore when suddenly an
explosion occurred below decks followed by quickly enveloping flames.
Fortunately for the boats occupants the cruiser was passing a yacht club
when the mishap took place. About twenty of the club's members
jumped into their boats and went to the aid of the stricken craft. So
prompt and able were their efforts that the fire was put out before the
yacht was near to destruction. The lives of those aboard the craft were
saved. Shortly thereafter the club members retained counsel to press
their claim for salvage. The hitherto grateful boat owner became vio-
lently indignant at the thought of recreational boat owners seeking a
salvage reward. Indignant or not, the insurance company lawyer after
researching the law wisely concluded that their claim was a meritorious
one and arranged for a mutually satisfactory settlement. . . . Salvage
is a service voluntarily rendered in relieving property from an impending
peril at sea or other navigable waters by those under no legal obligation
to do so.
Id. at 380-81.
101. "These ... boats more often than not, are operated by illiterate persons
who are unaware even that Rules of the Road exist." Dill v. Plaquemine Towing
Corp., 167 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. La. 1958). See Wiesemann v. Pavlat, 413 S.W.2d
23 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967), for a discussion of the use of the Missoumi APPROVED
INSTRUCTIONS in a maritime personal injury case involving the Rules of the Road.
102. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
197/4]
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the laws applicable to automobiles, are not easily understood, 10 3 and to the
uninitiated might appear to be totally unreasonable. 104
For the pleasure boat owner in Missouri the most important Rules are
the "Inland Rules"105 that apply to vessels close to the shoreline and to all
navigation on inland waters. 06 The Coast Guard has supplemented these
with "Pilot Rules for Inland Waters." 07 There are also some special rules
that apply to the "western rivers," 0 the chief of which is the Mississippi
River and its tributaries. The National Park Service and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers have promulgated additional regulations that apply to
vessels operating on waters under the control of those agencies.109 In addi-
tion, there are some special rules for sail and unpowered vessels.110
These rules are not optional or advisory. A vessel operator "shall" do
the designated acts. The Rules prescribe and limit a small pleasure boat
operator's conduct well beyond his probable expectation. For example, the
Rules establish the standard required for vessel lighting while underway or
at anchor, and while towing or being towed.'' Whistle signals are required
when approaching others 12 and when in a fog. 18 Discussed below are
"steering and sailing rules" that prescribe the required conduct of each
vessel in any of three common situations: (1) when meeting a vessel coming
from the opposite direction; (2) when overtaking another vessel; and (3)
when two vessels are on a crossing course.
103.
Collision liability under maritime law is determined by principles wholly
different that those governing automobile collisions, and the assessment
of fault. The law of safe driving is, for the most part, well-known to the
initiates on the jury. For that matter, most shore-side tort concepts are
readily understandable, as it is implicit in the court's charge to the jury,
when each of the twelve suddenly becomes a "prudent man."
A. Farrell, Liability for Collisions with Other Vessels, Fixed Objects, Etc.: The
Rules of the Road, PROGRAM MATEIALs, supra note 77.
104. "[T]he purpose of the Rules is to prevent collision." Societa Anonima
Navigazione Alta Italia v. Oil Transport Co., 232 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1956).
105. 38 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
106. Boundary lines of the inland waters are found at 33 C.F.R. § 82.1
(1973).
107. 33 C.F.R. §§ 80.01-.40 (1973). Available in pamphlet form free of
charge from any U.S. Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office as Pamphlet CG-169,
RULES OF Tm RoAD, ITE=RNATMNO2AL - IMNL1-.
108. 83 C.F.R. §§ 95.01-.80 (1973). Available in pamphlet form free of
charge from any U.S. Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office as Pamphlet C,-184,
RULES OF TnE ROAD, WhsTEnN Rxvmis. The Missouri Boat Commission has
adopted some of the Rules of the Road.
109. 83 C.F.R. § 207 (1973).
110. 33 U.S.C. §§ 174, 303 (1970).
111. 46 U.S.C. § 526(b) (1970). "The failure to carry proper lights, required
by statutory rules of navigation, is one of the most recklessly unlawful faults a
vessel can commit, and merits the severest condemnation." H & H Wheel Service,
Inc. v. Cornet, 219 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1955), quoting from Waring v. Clark,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
112. See text accompanying notes 114-120 infra.
113. 38 U.S.C. §§ 191, (1970).
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B. Approaching Vessel
Where vessels are meeting one another substantially head-on, certain
passing signals must be exchanged. On the western rivers, the vessel moving
downstream has the right of way in deciding in which direction to move.
That vessel will sound her horn one time if she proposes to pass on the
right, twice, if she intends to pass on the left. The other vessel repeats the
signal if it agrees with the proposed course of conduct.11 4 If either vessel
fails to understand the other's intention she is required to "immediately
signify the same by giving several short and rapid blasts, not less than four,
of the steam whistle."" 5 If one of the vessels does not sound its horn and
there is a collision, that vessel must prove that her failure to sound the horn
did not contribute to the cause of the accident." 6 The proof of this negative
proposition will be extremely difficult.
C. Overtaking
If one vessel wishes to overtake another proceeding in the same direc-
tion, it must request and obtain permission to do so from the vessel ahead."17
"Violation of the overtaking rule is one of the most frequent causes of
collision, and invariably the overtaking vessel is found at fault."" 8
The overtaking vessel sounds one blast of her horn. The vessel being
overtaken grants permission by sounding a blast. Should the overtaken
vessel fail to sound a signal, or if she gives a danger signal of four or more
short blasts, the overtaking vessel must slow and remain behind the
lead vessel." 9
D. Crossing Course
The most difficult application of the Rules of the Road is in regard
to vessels on a crossing course. The vessel that has the other on her
starboard (right) side is the "give-way" ship; the other is in the privileged
position. The privileged ship has an obligation to maintain her course and
speed; if she slows down without notice to the other vessel, and the latter
slows down in obedience to the Rules, a new collision course is created.
However, the privileged ship does not have the right to proceed oblivious
to the "give-way" ship's failure to act.120 She must at some point take
avoiding action.' 21
E. Prudence and Seamanship
Although the Rules of the Road are specific, there are occasions where
a court must apply a general tort requirement of prudence. Two of the
114. 83 U.S.C. § 203, Rule I (1970).
115. 33 U.S.C. § 203, Rule III (1970).
116. The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
117. 33 U.S.C. § 203, Rule VIII (1970).
118. Farrell, supra note 103, at AMF-7.
119. 33 U.S.C. § 203, Rule VIII (1970).
120. 83 U.S.C. §§ 204, 206-07 (1970). See also Annot., Last Clear Chance
Doctrine In Admiralty, 3 A.L.R. FED. 203 (1970). "Whether admiralty... applies
the common-law doctrine [last clear chance] has been said to be a 'clouded' and
unsettled legal question." Id. at 212.
121. The Fanwood, 28 F. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); The Aurania & The Republic,
1974]
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Rules-the "general prudential" rule1 22 and the "rule of good seamanship"W t
-enable one to argue that special circumstances require a departure from
the Rules or require that greater care be exercised than the Rules require.
One of these special circumstances may apply to a pleasure boat accident.124
V. DirmEi DAMAGEs Rujr25
Property damage liability in collision cases is based on fault, which is
usually established by a violation of the Rules of the Road. Because a Rule
violation is negligence per se, often each vessel will have been negligent.
Under the traditional common law rule, the claimant would be denied
recovery under the doctrine of contributory negligence.
Admiralty law has historically avoided this harsh result by dividing the
damages equally between the vessels. 26 Thus, if each vessel has violated
a navigation rule, and vessel A suffers $4,000 in damages and vessel B
suffers $3,000, vessel A can recover $500 from B.127 This result may be more
29 F. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1886); Wiesemann v. Pavlat, 418 S.W.2d 28, 27 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1967).
The crossing situation, and its agony for navigators, can best be imag-
ined by night. Vessel A is privileged but must maintain her course and
speed. Her watch sees the starboard green side and open white range
lights of B at a substantial distance off the port bow of A. Vessel B is
under the duty to give way in a classic crossing situation. She does
nothing. Minutes go by and the distance closes . . . Vessel B's bearing
remains unchanged, constantly 450 off the port bow. B's green light gets
larger and larger as A, in complete obedience, maintains her course and
speed. But for how long must she? The souls of seamen are now being
tried. If A hauls off to her port, to permit B to cross her bow, and if
that very moment B, finally obeying the law, turns to her starboard, they
will be heading into one another. If A turns to her starboard, and to a
new course, and B to her port, another intersecting collision course may
well be in the making, on a rapidly closing oblique angle.
Farrell, supra note 103, at AMF-8.
122. 88 U.S.C. § 212 (1970) provides:
In obeying and construing these rules due regard shall be had to all
dangers of navigation and collision, and to any special circumstances
[including the limitations of the craft involved] which may render a
departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate
danger.
123. 83 U.S.C. § 221 (1970) provides:
Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel, or the owner or master
or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or
signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, or of the neglect of
any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of sea-
men, or by the special circumstances of the case.
124. Many pleasure boat operators do not follow the Rules, at least to the
extent they apply to such activity. As a matter of speculation it is submitted that
"custom" may play a significant role in determining liability
125. See generally Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admi-
ralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CpAiF. L. REv. 804 (1957).
126. Lx LE.Y OLEOYnOuN, DE SUPEMIOMTATE MARTS ET JTRE ADmALrrATIS
ANGLL A, 12 Edw. 8 (1888). The rule has a biblical predecessor. Exodus 11:85
states: "And if one man s ox hurt another's, that he die; then they shall sell the
live ox, and divide the money of it; and the dead ox also they shall divide."
127. The Catharine, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 177 (1854).
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satisfactory than with contributory negligence, but its mechanical applica-
tion fails to acknowledge degrees of fault.
In 1910 the maritime nations agreed to an International Collision
Convention which adopted a rule of comparative negligence. 28 The United
States is the only major maritime nation that has failed to ratify or adhere
to the Convention. This failure has been harshly criticized . 29
The courts have occasionally escaped from the division of damages
rule through a "major-minor" fault principle,' 30 under which the vessel
guilty of minor fault is not required to divide damages with the other
vessel. The application of this judge-made rule is too uncertain for the
practitioner to rely on.
A 1962 federal district court decision in Illinois"'a attempted to repu-
diate the divided damages rule by asserting that the Supreme Court's
language that seemed to require it was only dictum. 32 Unfortunately, the
decision was reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.133 Divided
damages is still the law in admiralty.
VI. PERSONAL INJURIES
A. Injuries to Seamen
An injured seaman may take advantage of the plaintiff-favoring Jones
Act, 3 4 the doctrine of maintenance and cure,135 and the implied warranty
128. Convention for the Unif. of Certain Rules of Law Respecting Collisions,
Brussels, 1910.
129. Farrell, supra note 103, at AMF-11.
130. The Victory, 168 U.S. 410, 423 (1897); The Great Republic, 90 U.S.(23 Wall.) 20, 34 (1874); Staring, supra note 125, at 341 n.242.
131. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. Chicago, 209 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill.
1962).
132. Id. at 584-86.
138. N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. Chicago, 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963).
134. 88 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). Two of
the more unusual cases: An intoxicated seaman was left lying on a dock while
his sober shipmate went to notify a ship's officer. The shipowner was held liable
when the drunk in his stupor turned over and fell off the dock and drowned.
McDonough v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ohio 1951), affd,
200 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1958). A seaman
dropped a large fish. Unfortunately, it landed on one end of a board, causing the
other end to fly up and hit a fellow fisherman in the face. The shipowner had to
pay. Petricich v. Devlahovich, 107 F. Supp. 871 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
185. See generally Nowms, M~.rxrmm PERSONAL INjuIms § 13 (1966).
Maintenance and cure is the traditional right of a seaman who is injured or
becomes sick in the service of a ship to receive medical treatment plus the cost
of board and lodging until he is fit to return to work or until he has reached the
maximum possible cure. Seamen are regarded as wards of the admiralty court
and are given very liberal treatment. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724(1943). In Rowald v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 629 (E.D. Mo. 1965),
an injured seaman received maintenance and cure during the period of time he
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of seaworthiness (which approaches absolute liability). 186 These three
theories of recovery are independent of one another, although "there is
but a single wrongful invasion of his [the seaman's] primary right of bodily
safety and but a single legal wrong."187 The theories may be distinguished
as follows: (1) Maintenance and cure is an ancient maritime doctrine that
reads into the seaman's contract of employment a clause requiring the
employer to pay for the seaman's food, lodging, and wages during a portion
of his incapacity; (2) the Jones Act allows recovery for negligence-for pain
and suffering, permanent damage, lost wages, and medical expenses; (3)
seaworthiness is a warranty read into the seaman's employment contract
regarding the relative safety of the place of employment. Thus, the Jones
Act would cover a seaman injured by his employer's negligence while on
shore, although no cause of action for unseaworthiness would exist. Unsea-
worthiness could be found where the employer was not negligent. Mainte-
nance and cure lies even though the employee had a heart attack or brain
tumor and the ship was not unseaworthy nor the employer negligent.138 To
the extent that the damages recoverable under these theories overlap,
multiple recovery is not allowed. 39
Under the Jones Act, the defenses of assumption-of-risk, contributory
negligence, and fellow-servant negligence are eliminated and comparative
negligence is applied. Unlike state workmen's compensation systems, no
damage limitation is applied to the injured seaman.140
A seaman has been defined as "one whose occupation is to navigate
vessels upon the sea,"' 41 but that definition is too narrow. Although it is
136. See Comment, Recent Developments in the Doctrine of Unseaworthiness,
24 U. FLA. L. Rtv. 236 (1972); see generally Nonms, supra note 135, §§ 29-54.
In the early days of shipping, seaworthiness meant a vessel staunch and
sound in hull, and with gear and sail free of defects. Within recent
decades, however, under a series of court decisions in cases involving
personal injury, the concept of unseaworthiness has had some startling
and fantastic changes. A boat or vessel might appear to be in perfect
shape; but should there be a spot of oil or grease on a deck and should
that condition result in injury to a seaman, then the craft will be held
to be unseaworthy.
Nomus, Your BoAT Arm THE L w 155 (1965). See also Mitchell v. Traveler
Racer, Inc., 862 U.S. 539 (1960).
137. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130, 188 (1928).
138. See note 135 supra.
139. LaFontaine v. The G.M. McAllister, 101 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)(seaman permitted, following Jones Act recovery, to file second suit seeking
payment of maintenance and cure to the extent it did not seek double recovery).
In Central Gulf S.S. Corp. v. Sambula, 405 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1968), a seaman
recovered under the Jones Act because the employer had been negligent in
providing maintenance and cure. See Comment, The Case for a Federal Work-
men's Compensation Act to Cover Inland Waterways Seamen, 17 St. L.U.L.J.
475 (1973).
140. The Jones Act applies to the exclusion of state workmen's compensation
laws. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970); Pfister v. Bagdett Constr. Co., 65 S.W.2d 187(Spr. Mo. App. 1984); State ex rel. K.C. Bridge Co. v. Missouri Workmen's
Compensation Comm'n., 81 S.W.2d 986 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935), affd, 92 S.W.2d
624 (Mo. 1986).
141. BAcx's LAw DIcTIoNAlY 1517 (4th ed. rev. 1968); see Osland v. Star
Fish & Oyster Co., 107 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1939).
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unusual for an owner of a small pleasure craft to employ a crew, it is pos-
sible than an individual on the vessel will be a "seaman." 42
B. Injuries to Shore Workers
In pleasure boating accidents injuries to shore workers probably arise
more frequently than injuries to seamen, primarily because a pleasure boat
owner has more occasion to hire a shoreworker. Included in the category of
shoreworkers are repairmen,'4 ' watchmen,' janitors,'145 supplymen,' 4 long-
shoremen,'47 and others doing similar work.
Injuries to shoreworkers involved in pleasure boating accidents will
most frequently be redressed through the state workmen's compensation
system. However, there are occasions when the shoreworkers may be able
to take advantage of other remedies or where the state workmen's compen-
sation act will not apply.148
The Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act149
provdes the shoreworker his remedy against his employer where there was
an injury aboard a vessel in navigable waters. This remedy is considerably
more liberal than the state workmen's compensation act that would apply
if the injury occurred on shore. The act applies, however, only if the vessel
is at least 18 tons net.5 0
The seaman's remedies' 5' are available to a shoreworker if he can show
he is doing work traditionally done by seamen.152
142. In Walliser v. Bassett, 33 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1939), the widow
of a "seaman" collected from her husband's employer for his wrongful death.
The deceased was a shore employee of one of the owners of a sailing yacht who
had been taken on a cruise as the ship's cook. Because the cook was a "seaman,"
his widow was not restricted to workmen's compensation payments.
In In re Read's Petition, 224 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1963), a young man
came aboard to join a crew for a Miami to Nassau race. He neither sought nor
received payment for his services and was obliged to make other arrangements
for the return trip to Miami. During the race he was struck and seriously injured
by the handle of a defective winch. Because he had been helping with the sails,
he was found to be a "seaman."
143. Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953) (carpenter). See
Nomus, supra note 135, § 5.
144. Hillcone S.S. Co. v. Steffen, 136 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1943).
145. Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, 314 U.S. 244 (1941).
146. Beasley v. O'Hearne, 250 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.W. Va. 1966).
147. The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); Price v. S.S. Yaracuy, 378 F.2d
156 (5th Cir. 1967).
148. See Larson, Conflicts between Seamen's Remedies and Workmers
Compensation Acts, 40 FomHAtm L. RE:v. 473 (1972).
149. 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1970). See generally Noums, supra note 135,
§§ 140-194.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (1) (1970); Eldredge v. Weidler, 274 App. Div.
138, 81 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1946), appeal denied, 274 App. Div. 855, 82 N.Y.S.2d
385 (1948).
151. See notes 134-40 and accompanying text supra; George, Ship's Liability
to Longshoremen Based on Unseaworthiness, 19 LA. B.J. 11 (June 1971); Com-
ment, Maintenance and Cure, the Jones Act, and Land-Based Seamen, 46 TuI.AN
L. RE:v. 877 (1972).
152. See Comment, The Case for a Federal Workmen's Compensation Act to
Cover Inland Waterways Seamen, 17 ST. L.U.L.J. 475 (1973).
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C. Injuries to Guests
An injury to a guest on the navigable waters of the United States
gives rise to a cause of action for negligence under the general maritime
law,153 but the guest cannot proceed on the theory of unseaworthiness. 154
Assumption of the risk is not a defense, however, and comparative negligence
is applied.0 5 Admiralty courts draw no distinction between licensees and
invitees.i'0 Because the maritime law is applicable, laches, not a statute
of limitations, will apply.
D. Injuries to Water Skiers'57
A water skier can recover under the maritime law for injuries sustained
as a result of the negligent conduct of others. The cause of action for a
skiing injury is for negligence. The doctrines of assumption of the risk and
contributory negligence will only mitigate damages and will not bar
recovery.0 8
E. Wrongful Death159
In 1970 the United States Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine
Lies60 overturned a line of cases going back 84 years to The Harrisburg,'"
and held that there was a nonstatutory action for wrongful death under
the general maritime law. Previously, the only possible maritime death
actions were those authorized by federal or state statutes. z2 Moragne left
uncertain the elements of the new cause of action. The Courts said only
that "in most respects the law applied in personal-injury cases will answer
all questions that arise in death cases."'16 The Court indicated that a desire
153. Hovis v. The P & G Boat Store, 183 F. Supp. 810 (E.D. Mo. 1960).
154. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 858 U.S. 625 (1959);
see 37 TEMP. L.Q. 548 (1964), concluding that a passenger on a pleasure
boat is not, but should be, protected by a warranty of seaworthiness.
155. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959);
Tullis v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 397 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1968); Ardoin v. Union Oil
Co., 226 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. La. 1964); Moran v. The M/V Georgie May, 164
F. Supp. 881 (S.D. Fla. 1958) (another boats wake); Murphy v. Hutzel, 27 F.
Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1939); White's Estate, 82 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. 1957)
(failure to reduce speed).
156. Wood, The Applicable Law in Inland Maritime Torts, 19 Ar. L. REv.
354, 357 (1967).
157. Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 675 (1966).
158. Isaacson v. Jones, 216 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1954).
159. See generally Comment, The General Maritime Action for Wrongful
Death: Pleading and Practice in the Wake of Moragne, 10 HousT. L. REv. 101(1972); George & Moore, Recent Development in Maritime Wrongful Death
Since Moragne, 20 LA. B.J. 201 (1972).
160. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
161. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
162. Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Tungus v. Skovgaard, 858
U.S. 558 (1959); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). Apparently,
the maritime death action is applicable to the exclusion of the statutory actions.
Guilbeau v. Calzada, 240 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
163. 398 U.S. 375, 405 (1970).
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for uniformity in the general maritime law was a major reason for
the decision.164
At present it is uncertain who may prosecute a claim for wrongful
death. It has been argued that the schedule of beneficiaries in the Death
on the High Seas Act 65 should be used as a persuasive analogy 60 One
court has adopted the schedule,16 7 but others have not found it necessary
to do so.16
The measure of damages is also uncertain 6 9 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that survival damages (pain and suffering of the
decedent) may be recovered in a Moragne action. 70 The Sixth Circuit has
said that loss of consortium suffered between injury and death is not
compensable.' 7'
Although laches-and not a statute of limitations-would apply to this
new wrongful death action, the need for uniformity with the statutory death
actions has led some courts to impose the same limitation periods the
statutes prescribe. One court said that the applicable state limitation period
will apply.' 72 Another applied the three-year limitation period of the Jones
Act in the interest of uniformity.7 3 The Second Circuit has applied the
two-year limitation of the Death on the High Seas Act.1 74
Although these questions are unresolved, the Moragne decision greatly
changes the general maritime law. It could significantly expand the possible
liability of pleasure boat owners for death in a jurisdiction that otherwise
would place a statutory limit on a death action recovery.
164. Id. at 401.
165. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970). This act states that the personal representative
may initiate the suit.
166. The United States so argued as amicus curae in Moragne, but the
Supreme Court did not find it necessary to decide the point. 898 U.S. 375, 407
(1970).
167. Green v. Ross, 888 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Fla. 1972). See also Guilbeau
v. Calzada, 240 So. 2d 104 (La. Ct. App. 1970).
168. Mungin v. Calmar S.S. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 479 (D. Md. 1972) (mother
of illegitimate children of the deceased and one of the illegitimate children were
permitted to intervene in an action brought by the decedent's widow).
169. See Comment, Admiralty-the Proper Measure of Recovery Under the
Newly-Created General Maritime Law for Wrongful Death, 25 Arx. L. Buv. 510
(1972); 44 Miss. L.J. 809 (1978).
170. Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 828 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. La. 1971),
aff'd, 453 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1972). Pain and suffering is compensated under
the Jones Act but not under the Death on the High Seas Act, and so the Supreme
Court's desire for uniformity was not totally satisfied.
171. In re United States Steel Corp., 486 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971). Accord, Simpson v. Knutsen, 444 F.2d 528, 524(9th Cir. 1971); In re Canal Barge Co., 823 F.2d 805, 821 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
172. Spiller v. Thomas M. Lowe & Assoc., 828 F. Supp. 54 (W.D. Ark. 1971).
The Supreme Court seemed to indicate a contrary view in a companion case to
Moragne, Raskin v. P.D. Marchessini, Inc., 899 U.S. 519 (1970).
173. Thomas v. C.J. Langenfelder & Sons, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 325 (D. Md.
1971).
174. Fitzgerald v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1971).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Missourian who operates a pleasure boat on the Lake of the
Ozarks or any other navigable water of the United States and who is
involved in a maritime accident may discover that he and his attorney are
involved in a lawsuit that neither really understands. The attorney may find
himself concerned with legal principles with which he is totally unfamiliar.
An injured party may discover that his injuries will be largely uncom-
pensated because of the Limitation of Liability Act.
The party at fault may discover that the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff will not relieve him of liability.
In short, things can be different.
WMLIAM P. CRONAN
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